The Political Economy of Trade-Financial Liberalization and Financial Underdevelopment: A perspective from China by Morgan, Horatio M.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Political Economy of Trade-Financial
Liberalization and Financial
Underdevelopment: A perspective from
China
Horatio M. Morgan
Ryerson University
28 May 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50031/
MPRA Paper No. 50031, posted 21 September 2013 09:40 UTC
1 
 
The Political Economy of Trade-Financial Liberalization and Financial 
Underdevelopment: A perspective from China 
 
 
Horatio M. Morgan, PhD 
Assistant Professor, Global Management Studies Department  
Ted Rogers School of Management 
Ryerson University 
350 Victoria Street 
Toronto, Ontario 
Canada, M5B 2K3 
E-mail: horatio.morgan@ryerson.ca 
Telephone: (416) 979-5000 ext. 2526 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The Political Economy of Trade-Financial Liberalization and Financial 
Underdevelopment: A perspective from China 
 
Abstract 
Although financial development may facilitate economic growth over the long term, financial 
underdevelopment remains a salient feature of even leading emerging or transition economies. In 
principle, openness to both international trade and finance may weaken resistance to major 
financial reforms; however, the apparent failure to consolidate political support for such reforms 
in practice is not completely understood. This paper develops a simple model of the political 
economy of trade-financial liberalization that offers insights into this phenomenon. When 
applied to China, it not only facilitates a better understanding of its approach to financial 
integration in the global economy and why its relatively fragile state-bank dominated financial 
system has persisted; but more generally, it raises the question of whether limited de facto 
political competition in the domestic electoral system may be a binding constraint on the quantity 
and quality of the policies required to foster financial development.    
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The Political Economy of Trade-Financial Liberalization and Financial 
Underdevelopment: A perspective from China 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last few years, there has been a lively debate on the merit of financial 
globalization in the case of emerging or transition economies. On the one hand, some have 
questioned whether financial liberalization pay dividends that sufficiently compensate for the 
risk of financial crises and their associated costs (Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002). 
In addition, it remains unclear whether greater financial integration in the global economy 
generally raises social welfare through international risk-sharing, capital accumulation, or both 
(Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2003; Lucas, 1990).   
Still, another dominant view suggests that the indirect economic-growth enhancing 
benefits associated with financial globalization may sufficiently compensate for its associated 
risks (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2009). Specifically, it is argued that financial openness 
may foster financial development (Chinn and Ito, 2006; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Mishkin, 
2008); financial development in turn will support economic growth and thereby improves a 
country’s standard of living (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; King and Levine, 1993; 
Jayarantne and Strahan, 1996; McKinnon, 1973; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Moreover, since 
financial development may mitigate the likelihood of a twin-crisis in the banking sector and the 
foreign exchange market as the domestic economy becomes more financially integrated in the 
global economy, it provides a basis for stable economic growth trajectory (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Mishkin, 2008). 
If according to this latter perspective, financial development may place emerging or 
transition economies on an upward and potentially less risky growth path, why is there 
apparently so little, if any, domestic political support for financial reforms? According to the 
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interest group theory of Rajan and Zingales (2003), private interests have an incentive to resist 
financial development because the competitive forces that it unleashes are likely to erode their 
monopoly privileges, and the associated rents that they receive. However, while private interests 
may successfully frustrate domestic efforts to reform the financial system, they are unlikely to 
successfully resist reforms that are externally imposed. Specifically, the competitive forces that 
are unleashed from international trade and finance, the argument goes, may undermine domestic 
opposition to financial development. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to explain why political support for trade-financial 
liberalization may be systematically lacking in emerging or transition economies. It attempts to 
do so by explicitly considering the income distribution effects of trade and financial 
liberalization policies. For instance, to the extent that international trade facilitates the efficient 
use of resources worldwide, standard trade theories suggest that the least productive firms will 
lose market share, and may even go out of business (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, & Kortum, 2003; 
Melitz, 2003). In addition, when there are significant adjustment costs (i.e. retraining costs), 
displaced workers in declining industries may not be well-placed to immediately take advantage 
of employment opportunities in thriving ones.  
Meanwhile, financial openness may not only engender diffused benefits at best (Kose et 
al., 009), but also leaves those outside the financial sector unambiguously worse off in the event 
of a financial crisis (Baldacci, de Melo and Inchauste, 2002; Bourguignon, Robilliard and 
Robinson, 2001; Diwan, 2002; Friedman and Levinsohn, 2002; Halac and Schmukler, 2004; 
Lustig, 2000). Thus, even if an incumbent government has a favorable disposition toward both 
trade and financial liberalization, it may be ultimately constrained by its inability to consolidate 
political support for both trade and financial openness. 
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Importantly, this paper develops a simple model of the political economy of trade-
financial liberalization to refine this general understanding of the income distribution effects of 
international trade and finance policies. Specifically, it sheds light on the underlying properties 
of a political-economy “equilibrium” in which international trade-only policy is adopted and 
financial underdevelopment is persistent. It does so by showing that trade liberalization will be 
favored over financial liberalization, or a combination of trade and financial liberalization, if it 
yields relatively large, concentrated net gains to those with the power or influence to preserve the 
political status quo.  When applied to China, it not only offers insights into its approach to 
financial integration in the global economy; but supports the more general proposition that 
limited de facto political competition in the domestic electoral system may be a binding 
constraint on the quantity and quality of the policies that are required to foster financial 
development. 
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it extends Kornai 
(2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) by providing an example of the kind of political 
feasibility test that major economic reforms must pass if they are to succeed in transition 
economies. Specifically, it investigates the political economy of trade and financial liberalization 
in the Chinese context. The Chinese case is interesting for several reasons. Perhaps the most 
compelling reason is that it illustrates an extreme case of limited de facto political competition; 
and insofar as this constitutes a major constraint on financial development, there may be 
important general lessons for emerging or transition economies with weak political institutions. 
Another reason for focusing on China is that it appears to provide a counter-example to the 
conventional view that financial development is a precondition for long-term economic growth.  
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Finally, although this study generally agrees with Rajan and Zingales (2003) that vested 
interests may frustrate domestically initiated efforts to transform the financial system, it 
contributes to this line of research by calling into question the notion that emerging- or 
transition-economy governments will generally employ trade-finance liberalization as a 
mechanism for fostering financial development. What the authors appear to overlook is the fact 
that trade and financial openness will alter the distribution of national income, and thereby 
subject to political considerations. Once this is explicitly taken into account, it is shown that the 
problem of financial underdevelopment may ultimately depend on indigenous solutions rather 
than international ones.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a simple 
model of the political economy of trade-financial liberalization that is motivated by China`s 
economic performance. This theoretical framework is then applied in the next section to 
determine the potential role of politics in the persistence of a relatively fragile state-bank 
dominated financial system in China. The final section summarizes and concludes. 
2. Background 
The discussion above generally points to financial development as one of the key 
preconditions for economic growth over the long term. Yet, China appears to constitute a 
counter-example; that is, its relatively weak state-bank dominated financial system has 
apparently not significantly constrained its growth trajectory over the last three decades. 
However, this macroeconomic outlook is misleading.  
One of the manifestations of financial underdevelopment in China is the importance of 
informal (relationship-based) finance relative to formal (bank) finance. One way to show that 
financial underdevelopment is costly is to demonstrate that the fastest growing firms primarily 
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depend on formal finance. There is evidence for this in the Chinese context. Specifically, even 
among private and semi-private Chinese firms that tend to generally outperform state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), there is evidence that the fastest growing firms tend to primarily rely on 
formal rather than informal finance (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2010). If non-SOEs, which now account for a significant share in 
industrial output and employment, are forced to disproportionately rely on informal finance, then 
economic growth trajectory is actually lower than its potentially higher path. 
Alternatively, to the extent that bank credit is disproportionately allocated to capital-
intensive SOEs with relatively low productivity, the Chinese economy is unlikely to remain on 
its current growth trajectory all else equal. In other words, if the growth of the capital stock is not 
complemented by technological innovations and human capital development, then higher levels 
of capital relative to labor will become less productive at the margin over time (Collins and 
Bosworth, 1996; Krugman, 1994). This in turn will lead to a decline in the per capita income 
growth rate. Thus, a domestic investment boom that merely raises the existing capital stock 
relative to the labor force will not be sufficient to keep the Chinese economy on its current 
growth path (Prasad, 2009, 2011; Prasad and Rajan, 2006). 
Central to the notion of financial development in this paper is the basic principle that 
capital should be allocated to those who can use it most productively or profitably. Alternatively, 
risks should be assigned to those with the greatest capacity to bear them for the least 
compensation. The latter is consistent with financial innovation that leads to the creation, for 
instance, of new financial products that facilitate the effective management of systematic 
financial risks (i.e. unexpected changes in foreign exchanges, interest rates and commodity 
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prices). When financial development is advanced along these lines, a country has a solid 
platform for economic growth over the long term.  
These foregoing arguments suggest that the Chinese economy has major shortcomings in 
the area of financial development with adverse implications for its growth trajectory. Since Rajan 
and Zingales (2003) suggest that trade-financial liberalization may serve as a catalyst for 
financial development, it is worthwhile to investigate this in greater detail based on an 
appropriate theoretical framework. To do so, I develop a simple model of the political economy 
of trade-financial liberalization in the next section. This theoretical framework explicitly 
accounts for the income distribution effects of trade-financial liberalization that appears to be 
overlooked in Rajan and Zingales (2003). As will be illustrated, this has implications for whether 
an incumbent government promotes either trade or financial liberalization, or both. 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
Consider an incumbent government that has to decide on an international trade and 
financial policy in a multi-party electoral system, and a closed economy populated by N voters. 
Specifically, suppose the incumbent government is contemplating whether to open the economy 
to international trade, international finance, or both. On the one hand, trade liberalization or trade 
openness will allow domestic residents to buy and sell goods and services abroad, while financial 
liberalization or financial openness will allow them to buy and sell foreign financial claims.  
Suppose the adoption of trade openness (TO), financial openness (FO) or both (     ) 
will give rise to the following three different states of the world:                         , 
                        , and                                      with 
corresponding sets of probabilities       ,        , and          , respectively. The initial 
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autarky position of the economy is assumed to be characterized by state                      
with a corresponding set of probabilities      .  
In this setting, we suppose that voters care about policy outcomes because the returns on 
their economic activities are contingent on the policy-induced states of the world. Voters are 
assumed to know the probability distributions associated with international policies and the 
autarky state. Political parties are assumed to know voter international policy preferences, the 
probability distributions associated with international policies and the autarky state, and are 
willing to compete for votes through international policy proposals. A single opposition party 
may be sufficient in this case to motivate the incumbent government to offer an international 
policy proposal that satisfies the policy preference of an influential set of voters who are willing 
to trade political support for a favorable policy-shift from the initial autarky state of the domestic 
economy. To secure the broadest possible support for the incumbent government, it is assumed 
that this group of voters makes side-payments to other voters with a different policy preference; 
otherwise, the latter will vote against the incumbent government.  
Consider the following single-period international policy decision problem. The 
incumbent government implements its international policy at the start of period; and knowing the 
probability distribution associated with the international policy decision, the incumbent 
government’s supporters instantaneously undertake an identical productive activity. The state of 
the world and the payoff from the productive activity are realized at the end of the period. 
Specifically, if we suppose that all the potential supporters of the incumbent government have 
the same preference over policy-induced wealth outcomes, then the policy preference of a 
representative supporter of the government is ordered by the discounted sum of the expected 
utilities; that is: 
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 [ (              )]   ∑  (   )                       (1) 
where                          is the single-period constant discount factor;    is the 
single economic action (i.e. production or investment decision) that is undertaken by the 
voters;           is the payoff function that gives the gross returns that government-supporters 
receive as a group from an identical action    under state         is the minimum number of 
voters from the population of   voters that the incumbent government requires to maintain its 
hold on power;   is a one-time lump-sum side-payment by    government-supporters to      
non-supporters. To capture the contingency of gross returns on the choice of the international 
policy, it is assumed that the gross payoff function is such that       ⁄          or 
      ⁄          when evaluated at some realized value of    . Finally, assuming that all 
voters are risk averse, the utility function,     , satisfies the standard assumptions; that is, 
        and         . 
According to equation 1, a representative government-supporter ranks the government’s 
policy on trade and financial openness based on the discounted sum of expected utilities derived 
from the policy-contingent net payoffs. For any realized state of the world, the representative 
government-supporter receives an appropriation,             , from which she pays out      
in a single side-payment to non-supporters. Now, suppose the expected reservation utility under 
the autarky position is given by       (     )   at the start of the period, then the government 
rationally expects political support for an international trade or finance policy that satisfies: 
 [ (              )]        (     )       (2) 
The incumbent government has an incentive to undertake both trade and financial 
liberalization if for  ̂           the policy preference of its political base satisfies: 
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 { [  (     )]}   [ (   ̂      ̂     )]   [ (                      )] (3) 
Consistent with the virtual absence of entirely closed economies, integration in the global 
economy through either trade, or financial linkages, or both, seems to be revealed preferred to 
economic isolation; hence, it is implicitly assumed that the supporters of the incumbent 
government at least weakly prefer some form of openness to the initially closed-economy state. 
But equation 3 goes further by specifically showing that the supporters of the incumbent 
government derive the highest discounted sum of the expected utilities from both trade and 
financial liberalization relative to either a trade-only, or a financial-only liberalization policy. As 
a result, the incumbent government can rationally expect to consolidate political support for the 
simultaneous implementation of trade and financial liberalization policies.  
To anticipate the discussion in the next section, I consider an analytical result that is 
consistent with trade openness and limited financial openness that will be shown to be 
characterize China’s approach globalization. To counter the potential objection that this multi-
party theoretical framework is inappropriately applied to China’s single-party political system, I 
evoke the notion of “contestability”. Specifically, although the Chinese Communist Party is not 
directly competing against other formally organized political parties, it is plausible that it 
considers the political appeal of latent political organizers or revolutionary forces when deciding 
on a range of domestic and international policies. However, the question is raised later on 
whether the inherent suppression of political competition under single-party systems may 
compromise the capacity of a country to generate the domestic and international policies 
required for financial development. 
For  ̃              the following result is most consistent with China’s apparent 
approach to globalization: 
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 { [  (     )]}   [ (   ̃      ̃     )]   [ (                )]  (4) 
According to equation 4, the representative government-supporter derives the highest 
discounted sum of expected utilities from trade liberalization relative to financial liberalization or 
the joint implementation of both trade and financial liberalization. Since the trade-only 
liberalization scheme also leaves the representative government-supporter better off relative to 
the initial autarky state of the domestic economy, the incumbent government can rationally 
expect to consolidate political support for trade liberalization. 
In theory, there are at least two fundamental reasons why the government’s political base 
may prefer trade liberalization relative to either financial liberalization, or the joint 
implementation of trade-financial liberalization. First, Pareto-improving outcomes may be more 
likely under trade liberalization. This is so if high probabilities are assigned to the above-average 
positive realizations of the net payoffs under trade liberalization,  (       )     relative to the 
net payoffs under financial liberalization,  (       )   , or the joint trade-financial 
liberalization scheme,  (          )      Insofar as financial liberalization elevates the risk of 
financial crises (Aghevli, 1999; Bosworth and Collins, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998, 
1999), another possibility is that low probabilities may be assigned to high-impact events under 
financial liberalization relative to trade liberalization. This implies that financial liberalization 
may expose government supporters and others to far more extreme risks, or discontinuity in the 
returns from their economic activities compared to trade liberalization. 
Finally, if for  ̃                    ̃, then a trade-only liberalization policy not 
only has the potential to generate high-probability, above-average Pareto-improving outcomes, 
but also more concentrated gross gains net of side-payments for the group of government-
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supporters that prefer trade-only liberalization to either financial-only liberalization, or both trade 
and financial liberalization. As a result, the incumbent government’s pro-trade political base has 
an incentive to organize, and consolidate political support for the incumbent government (Olson, 
1965; Stigler, 1971).  
3. The Political Economy of Financial Globalization in China 
The theoretical framework developed above provides a basis for evaluating the nature of 
business-government co-operation that seems to undergird the Chinese government’s apparent 
approach to globalization, as well as the persistence of a relatively fragile state-bank dominated 
financial system (Barnett, 2004). Since the Chinese government initiated its market-based 
reforms in the late 1970s, the most sweeping changes have largely been confined to the 
economic sphere under China’s one-party system. The progressive integration of the Chinese 
economy in the global economy has been marked by several important developments.  
Among the key developments is China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001. Since then China’s participation in international trade has intensified and 
remains significant considering the size of the Chinese economy. For instance, China’s trade-to-
GDP ratio (i.e. sum of imports and exports divided by GDP) increased from an average of 
approximately 15 percent over the period 1980-84 to almost an average of 65 percent during 
2005-08 (Marelli and Signorelli, 2011). Thus, the Chinese economy appears to be well 
networked in the global economy through trade linkages.  
However, a much different picture emerges when one considers the extent to which the 
Chinese economy is embedded in the global economy through financial linkages. For instance, 
the Chinese authorities closely manage the capital account by imposing limits on the 
international transactions of domestic residents, as well as by promoting inward foreign direct 
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investment (FDI) rather than portfolio investments (Wong, 2006). At the same time, China’s  
“Big Four” state-banks - Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Construction Bank (CCB), 
Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) - control about three-
fourths of the assets in the domestic banking sector, with only a handful of foreign investors – 
including Citigroup, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland - allowed to hold minority 
equity stakes in state-banks (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009). 
Altogether, the Chinese government appears to favor trade openness over financial 
openness in its approach to globalization. China’s state-bank dominated financial system has 
grown considerably over the years in terms of domestic savings under financially repressive 
policies that not only historically channeled funds away from the domestic stock markets, but 
also limit international portfolio diversification among private residents (Wong, 2006).  
According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), trade liberalization alone cannot be expected to 
unleash the competitive forces needed to undermine vested interests that stand to gain from 
China’s fragile financial system. While international financial integration together with trade 
liberalization may do so, the former may not materialize. According to the theoretical framework 
developed in the previous section, the Chinese government may promote trade liberalization 
alone if it constitutes the policy preference of its supporters who are willing and able to organize, 
and consolidate broad support for political continuity. In principle, this raises the question of 
why Chinese exporters that primarily favor trade liberalization do not similarly express a policy 
preference for financial openness.  
It is perhaps surprising that Chinese exporters have not strongly pushed for a dismantling 
of a state-bank dominated financial system that disproportionately benefits the largest SOEs, and 
particularly national champions that invest abroad (Nolan and Zhang, 2002). To the extent that 
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Chinese exporters serve internationally competitive markets, better access to low-cost credit 
could go a far way in improving their competitive position and profitability. Meanwhile, 
financially repressive policies that force Chinese exporters to disproportionately hold low-yield 
bank deposits rather than high-yield (risk-adjusted) foreign assets is costly in terms of foregone 
interest earnings. These costs to Chinese exporters could be mitigated under a financial 
liberalization policy that not only fosters competition in the banking sector, but also permits 
international portfolio diversification; yet, Chinese exporters seem to exhibit a policy preference 
for trade liberalization only. 
The theoretical framework developed above supports two explanations for what may be a 
trade-only policy preference among Chinese exporters. First, the gains that they realize from 
trade liberalization are apparently large enough to pacify the “losers” through transfer payments. 
In practice, these transfer payments may be financed through a tax on the earnings of exporters. 
Given China’s relatively underdeveloped tax system, the Chinese government may very well 
depend on an implicit taxation scheme. For instance, over the period 1991-98, Gordon and Li 
(2003) find that the real interest rate on bank deposits is not only negative, but is also on average 
significantly below the foreign borrowing cost of the Chinese government. Thus, exporters that 
hold bank deposits may be subjected to a potentially large implicit tax on their savings.  
Another reason for the apparently singular preference for trade liberalization in the 
Chinese context is that it is likely to yield large concentrated net gains relative to financial 
liberalization. For the most part, the most thriving Chinese exporters constitute township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) that are primarily involved in light manufacturing as opposed to 
heavy industries (i.e. steel and chemical) that are dominated by Chinese SOEs. While most TVEs 
are owned and operated by local governments, they may constitute Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
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and even private enterprises in some cases (Nolan and Wang, 1999). Interestingly, too, TVEs are 
primarily located along the coastal areas that disproportionately benefit from favorable 
investment and trade policies (Yang, 2002). Finally, TVEs’ exporting activity is primarily linked 
to assembly work that is contracted out by multinational corporations (MNCs) that co-ordinate 
their value chain across different countries (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). 
According to the foregoing arguments, Chinese exporters seem to favor trade 
liberalization over either financial liberalization, or both trade and financial liberalization, 
because the former yield relatively high concentrated net gains. The Chinese government in turn 
has an incentive to promote trade-only liberalization. This consistency in policy preference and 
policy choice ensures that the Chinese government has allies among the emerging class of light-
industry exporters.  At the same time, insofar as the Chinese government is keen on maintaining 
control over credit allocation, Chinese exporters may face a more limited set of international 
policy proposals than is depicted in our theoretical framework; specifically, the Chinese 
government may not incorporate financial liberalization, or both trade and financial liberalization 
in its international policy plans.  
In addition, to the extent that financial liberalization tends to disproportionately attract 
foreign-currency denominated short-term debt inflows relative to FDI, or create financial 
channels that propagate external shocks, the Asian experience in the latter half of the 1990s 
confirms that the likelihood of financial crisis may be particularly high. This is especially so in 
the presence of unsustainable macroeconomic policies and underdeveloped domestic financial 
markets (Aghevli, 1999; Bosworth and Collins, 1999; Goldstein, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1998, 1999). Considering China’s relatively inflexible exchange rate regime and its fragile state-
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bank dominated financial system, the likelihood of a financial crisis under financial liberalization 
would almost certainly preoccupy the Chinese authorities.  
Although the fiscal costs of financial crises are oftentimes large enough to warrant 
concern about financial liberalization (Hutchinson and Noy, 2005), the Chinese government may 
also be equally concerned about the potential loss of political autonomy if a major financial crisis 
unfolds (Bhagwati, 1998). This concern is warranted if, for instance, an externally organized 
financial rescue package is expected to come with certain conditions including the privatization 
of large SOEs, major financial reforms, among others. Such conditions would almost certainly 
limit the ability of the Chinese authorities to control the allocation of credit and determine social 
priorities.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper illustrates what appears to be a political-economy “equilibrium” in which 
China’s financial system may persist in an underdeveloped state. Central to this equilibrium is 
business-government co-operation that favors trade liberalization only. In theory, this is 
attributed to the relatively large and concentrated gains that trade liberalization yields relative to 
financial integration. Besides, the Chinese authorities may be keen on insulating the domestic 
banking system from the international financial system to mitigate the risk of a financial crisis, 
which may undermine their control over credit allocation and the determination of social 
priorities. Ultimately, financial integration may be largely avoided by the Chinese authorities to 
secure political autonomy over the long term. 
Insofar as the preservation of political autonomy is important, the limited range of 
international policy choices in a political-economy equilibrium may be a salient feature of 
single-party systems, or even democratic ones with limited de facto political competition. 
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Perhaps the most relevant policy implication is that political reform, in the direction of greater de 
facto political competition, may be very important for financial development. However, a 
complete economic-political analysis along this line is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, an 
outstanding issue that warrants further theoretical and empirical analysis is the impact of de facto 
political competition on the quantity and effectiveness of domestic and international policies that 
are geared toward financial development.  
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